ANALYSIS: ISWAP’s ‘hearts and minds’ strategy failing, Nigeria must take advantage

For years, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) presented itself to the public as an alternative government and a group that cared about civilians – unlike its rival Boko Haram faction Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunna Lidda’Awati Wal-Jihad (JAS).

This elaborate propaganda was aimed at winning over local communities to boost ISWAP’s recruitment and revenue drives. With millions of people displaced and livelihoods lost due to years of Boko Haram conflict, the violent extremist group capitalised on these vulnerabilities.

Following its split from Abubakar Shekau’s JAS in 2016, the Islamic State (IS)-backed ISWAP moved to the Lake Chad islands. The group took advantage of the area’s economic bounty by securing trade routes abandoned during the conflict. It sent word that civilians in Lake Chad Basin should come to live and work in areas under its control, promising them protection.

A former ISWAP cleric and judge told ISS Today: “We met with fishermen and asked them to carry the message to Maiduguri and other places, that they should feel free to come here and do their business.”

Fishermen, farmers, herders, traders, transporters and others from Boko Haram-affected areas moved to the islands. Unlike JAS, ISWAP fighters were prohibited from carrying out raids against civilian communities. No fighter could harass civilians in these areas, with defaulters facing severe punishment, from whipping and detention to execution. ISWAP’s revenue surged as word spread that it was safe there.

This bubble now seems to have burst, as civilians under the group’s control and those from other communities have increasingly come under attack from ISWAP fighters. The group is also abducting and executing men in communities outside its control, such as in Kukawa Local Government Area in Borno State. The Institute for Security Studies’ monitoring of ISWAP propaganda materials shows there were at least three abductions between March and April and nine executions between April and June this year.

Elders from one community said that in April, they sent a delegation to ISWAP to enquire about their young men, but received no answers. Then ISWAP members came to explain that the youths were taken for different reasons, including collaborating with security forces and crimes like armed robbery.

Borno State, northeast Nigeria

The popular fishing town of Baga in Kukawa was hit especially hard. In May, ISWAP fighters attacked the town and killed at least 15 people, giving residents two weeks to vacate – a threat aimed at stopping locals from collaborating with security forces. Civilians in nearby Tumbum Rogo, an island under ISWAP’s control, were also ordered to leave within a week. The group understands that forcing residents to vacate communities increases their vulnerability.

On 3 June, ISWAP went around the island, ordering those who refused to leave to gather in an open space used for sun-drying and smoking fish. The civilians panicked and some ran, sensing danger. ISWAP fighters opened fire on them, killing at least 40 civilians according to those who escaped. Around 75 others weren’t accounted for.

The most shocking recent attack was the 1 September massacre of over 100 civilians in Mafa village, Yobe State. ISWAP accused the villagers of providing information to security forces, which resulted in the killing of four of its couriers, the arrest of its informants, and the seizure of its goods around the village.

For those following the conflict, ISWAP-sanctioned raids and armed robberies in Borno State are equally surprising. Attacks are also happening on highways linking local governments with Maiduguri, the state capital, and one linking Gamboru-Ngala in eastern Borno State with Maiduguri. ISWAP fighters from the Alargarno Forest area perpetrate these assaults.

Three reasons may explain ISWAP’s increasing attacks on civilians. First, military operations have forced the group to make desperate decisions. In early 2024, the Multinational Joint Task Force’s Operation Lake Sanity 2, in coordination with Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad’s armies, targeted ISWAP’s strongholds in the Lake Chad areas and Alargarno and Sambisa forests. Several ISWAP facilities were destroyed and their fighters and commanders killed or injured. The terrorist group believes civilians provided information to security agents, which justifies their attacks on communities.

The second reason is the ISWAP-JAS rivalry. Following Shekau’s murder by ISWAP and the loss of Sambisa Forest, JAS’ new leader, Bakura Doro, knew he would soon be targeted. Bakura’s relentless military campaign against ISWAP has forced that group’s leader and IS focal point in West Africa and the Sahel, Abu Musab al-Barnawi, to temporarily relocate to the Alargarno Forest area.

Some ISWAP fighters decided to leave the group and surrender to security forces because of battle weariness. As JAS ejects ISWAP from their territories, they also attack and raid civilians who are caught up in these clashes – wondering if ISWAP can continue protecting them.

The third reason for ISWAP allowing its fighters to raid and rob civilians is hunger. Former fighters who recently left territories controlled by the group in Alargarno Forest complained of excessive hunger. They said ISWAP feared that fighters might revolt or surrender to government forces if a solution wasn’t found. The area lacks the food production capacity and economic opportunities of those around Lake Chad.

ISWAP provided cash incentives and agricultural inputs like chemicals and seedlings to fighters and some civilians in the Alargarno Forest area, but this wasn’t enough. So, rather than risk a revolt or desertions by fighters, ISWAP gave them ‘temporary permission’ to rob civilians in government-controlled areas pending the arrival of harvest season.

Governments in the region could use ISWAP’s deteriorating relations with civilians to counter terrorist propaganda. That will require providing communities in affected areas with better alternatives than those offered by the two Boko Haram factions, including security, essential services and livelihood support.

Such actions would encourage civilians to leave ISWAP-controlled areas, depriving the group of its ability to recruit fighters, generate revenue, get supplies or produce food.

Malik Samuel, Researcher, Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel, Institute for Security Studies (ISS)

(This article was first published by ISS Today, a Premium Times syndication partner. We have their permission to republish).