Lagos – Calabar coastal highway: How not to repeat the Lagos-Ibadan expressway saga, By Tunde Ajia

When President Tinubu unveiled plans to construct the Lagos – Calabar coastal highway, he began arguably one of Africa’s most gigantic undertakings in decades. Poised to be a transformative piece of infrastructure, the Nigerian government says the strategic road will enhance connectivity and boost economic growth along the coastal states by bolstering trade, tourism, and agriculture by providing a direct and efficient route for transporting goods and people.

It will span 700 kilometres, cost a whopping N15 trillion and the timeline given is eight years. For a project so promising, it’s facing controversies and criticisms over transparency and prioritisation way too early. It may likely run into the same land mines that plagued its predecessors, such as the Lagos – Ibadan expressway.

With prominent figures like former Vice President Atiku Abubakar questioning the procurement process and cost estimates, many Nigerians now label the project as potentially wasteful and lacking due process. For some, the project could be Tinubu’s attempt to outshine an old predecessor from his home zone, the South-West region of the country, on whose watch the Lagos – Ibadan expressway was completed decades ago.

Although, the Presidency has repeatedly churned out reassurances, mere words are no match for the 45-year long back-and-forth that plagued the Lagos – Ibadan expressway project which remains fresh in the Nigerian psyche.

Looking Back

Commissioned in 1978, the Lagos – Ibadan expressway was West Africa’s first dual-carriageway. The then military government of Olusegun Obasanjo intended to bolster Nigeria’s transportation infrastructure and facilitate seamless travel between Lagos, the then commercial capital, and Ibadan, one of its largest cities. It symbolised modernisation expected to revolutionise logistics, significantly cutting down the time and cost of moving goods and people between the bustling metropolis of Lagos and the hinterland, thus boosting economic growth.

However, the road soon became synonymous with chronic delays, safety hazards, and infrastructural decay. Over the years, it has suffered from poor maintenance, rampant traffic congestion and numerous accidents. Despite several attempts at rehabilitation by multiple administrations, the project has faced persistent setbacks due to corruption, inadequate funding, and mismanagement.

In 2013, the Goodluck Jonathan administration took a major step to save the day. It terminated the concession of the expressway, which his predecessor, Umaru Yar’Adua, granted to the Bi-Courtney consortium in May 2009. “As a responsible government, I don’t think we can allow Nigerians to continue to suffer. All of us in government feel pained that the country is held to ransom because of a transaction that probably was not consummated properly because of some kind of issues. But we cannot continue like this. We will intervene on that road,” Jonathan explained.

The then Minister of Works, Mike Onolememen, clarified that the Federal Government had to terminate the road concession to Bi-Courtney due to the “failure of the company to reach financial closure as provided for in the agreement.” Thereafter, it engaged the services of Julius Berger Plc and R.C.C Nigeria Limited to “commence work immediately on the reconstruction of the expressway.”

However, that did little to improve the situation. The systemic challenges persisted. For instance, despite the initial allocation of funds, the project frequently encountered budget cuts and delays in fund disbursement. Although N30 billion was allocated to the project, only N11 billion was eventually made available due to cuts by the eighth National Assembly in 2017. There were also logistical hurdles, including land acquisition issues, utility relocations and frequent theft of construction materials.

Due to the long lag time, new requirements such as the construction of toll gates and flyovers to accommodate growing traffic and religious institutions along the route sprang up. These necessitated additional funding and extended timelines, too. There were also accusations of poor oversight and coordination. As of early 2024, after expenses of over N311 billion, the project still remains uncompleted.

Deja Vu

While it may be too early to christen the Lagos – Calabar Coastal project as another Lagos – Ibadan expressway waiting to happen, however the signs are overwhelmingly clear. The first is citizens’ buy-in. Though some Nigerians commended the idea of a major road linking the South – West and the South – South parts of the country, a sizeable number are yet to understand why the government wants to pursue such a massive project when many interstate roads lie in total decay.

Perhaps the most controversial issue is procurement.

Staunch critics such as former Vice President Atiku Abubakar have raised concerns about the lack of a competitive bidding process that, he said, contravenes the 2007 Public Procurement Act. The Federal Government contracted Hitech Construction Ltd to execute the project. Hitech is owned by a Nigerian – Lebanese business magnate, Gilbert Chagoury, who is President Tinubu’s “personal confidant.” Abubakar also drew attention to another startling fact: the president’s son, Seyi Tinubu, sits on the board of CDK Integrated Industries, a subsidiary of Chagoury Group. He argued that such affiliations constitute a conflict of interest. While some do not frown at awarding contracts to deserving political allies who can deliver on the job, concerns lie in disallowing other qualified contractors a fighting chance for the “contract of the century.”

Emanating from that is the challenge of the legitimacy of the project’s numbers. Constructing the coastal highway will cost ₦15 trillion, leaving Nigerians wondering if they got the best deal. The Nigerian government says it has approved ₦1.06 trillion to construct the first few kilometres covering Eko Atlantic to Lekki Deep Seaport. The Minister of Works Dave Umahi says the concrete-based road will cost ₦4 billion per kilometre. However, there are doubts about this estimate as the bidding process was not competitive. This reality pits the government against the Nigerian public over a perceived lack of transparency.

Another disputed promise on the project is its eight-year completion timeline, which critics say is the government’s way of selling a pipe dream to Nigerians. With projects such as the Lagos – Ibadan expressway ,which remains under construction more than ten years later still fresh in their collective memory, many citizens do not believe the coastal road can be completed within the stipulated time frame.

But it’s not all gloom and doom yet. Having started on the wrong foot, the government and all stakeholders can take the below certain steps to win back buy-in, repair trust and deliver the project:

1. Transparency

One of the significant issues with the Lagos – Ibadan expressway was the lack of transparency in the awarding of contracts, which led to delays and suspicions of perceived corruption. For the Lagos – Calabar Coastal project, the government has already faced criticism for by-passing a competitive bidding processes, as seen with the direct awarding of the contract to Hitech Construction Ltd., a company linked to associates of President Tinubu.

While it may be impractical to return to competitive bidding, the government can be more open with its numbers and progress and ensure timely delivery in every phase of the project to win back trust in the project’s integrity. With just under seven and a half more years to go, this approach will minimise the risk of inflated costs and ensure that the project wins the buy-in of contiguous communities along its path.

2. Comprehensive Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIA)

The Lagos – Ibadan expressway faced significant backlash due to the insufficient consideration of environmental and social impacts, leading to widespread discontent among affected communities. Similarly, the Lagos – Calabar Coastal project commenced without a comprehensive ESIA, resulting in public outcry and legal challenges over the demolition of residential and commercial edifices. Critics argue that the lack of initial assessments could lead to long-term environmental and social issues, such as the demolition of properties without adequate compensation.

It is not too late to conduct a thorough ESIA before proceeding with construction. These assessments help identify potential environmental and social impacts early, allowing for the development of mitigation strategies to address these concerns. Engaging with the myriads of soon-to-be affected communities and stakeholders transparently ensures their voices are heard and their rights are protected.

3. Realistic Timelines and Cost Projections

The Lagos – Ibadan expressway’s prolonged construction timeline and escalating costs have been a significant source of frustration. The initial timelines were overly optimistic, failing to account for potential delays and financial uncertainties. The Lagos – Calabar Coastal project is similarly ambitious, with an eight-year completion goal and significant financial projections that critics argue are unrealistic given the project’s scope and today’s economic environment.

President Tinubu must readjust his expectations and those of Nigerians by setting realistic timelines and cost estimates. Transparent communication by the Nigerian government about projected costs and timelines, along with periodic updates, can help manage public expectations and promote accountability.

Conclusion

As the Nigerian government pushes forward with the coastal highway, ensuring transparency, stakeholder engagement, and efficient management will be crucial to avoid repeating previous mistakes and genuinely uplift Nigeria’s infrastructure landscape. Some ways to do this is through early, inclusive stakeholder involvement, open accountability through periodic assessment, prioritising only plans that are in line with the project’s strategy.

• Tunde Ajia is an infrastructure advisory and project strategy consultant.