Nigeria’s public service reform foundation (III), By M.J. Balogun

As the third in the series of articles on public service reform, this one examines the earliest efforts at constructing the foundation of the career civil service. It starts with the contention that contemporary attempts at reforming the public service have failed to yield the desired results mainly because the preferred measures have not been equal to the challenge. The attempts focused largely on tinkering with the foundation laid during the pre-independence institution-building era, to the neglect of the revival and fortification of the institutions and values that were inherited from the British, but which were subsequently exposed to the vagaries of the post-independence environment. Due largely to the lack of consensus on the key reform issues, the terms of reference of reform panels were either not specific on the core elements, or where they were, merely reflected the predilections of the forces that were dominant at any particular time, particularly at a time when pressures for change could not be resisted.

The reforms undertaken in the 1980s and 1990s were particularly notorious for starting with terms of reference which masked ulterior motives and exacerbated situations that change champions sought to “improve”. The reforms were basically a mix of inter-group power play, and episodic, time-bound recalibration of structures and processes. In the end, the obsession with the redress of manifest organization and management imbalances deflected the reforms from the latent but weighty considerations of attitude modification, probity, accountability, and improved service delivery.

Of course, the history of reform did not start in the 1980s or the 1990s. It began much earlier. The pre-independence reforms, for instance, deserve to be acknowledged for laying the foundation on which the public service was built. Long before Nigeria became independent, the colonial administration had set up a number of commissions to review the structure and functions of the civil service. These include the Tudor Davis Commission that was established in 1945 to submit proposals on wages and conditions of service, the Harragin Commission which in 1946 reviewed civil service organization, grading and salary structure, and the Millar Commission which, based on the six zones into which the country was divided, recommended the payment of wages indexed to employees’ locations.

In 1948, another Commission headed by Sir Hugh M. Foot was established. Its remit included submitting proposals on the training of Nigerians to prepare them for appointment to senior positions in the public service. Following Foot’s landmark recommendations on the “Nigerianization” of the civil service and the establishment of Central and Regional Public Service Boards, the Government in 1952 appointed another Commission—the Phillipson-Adebo Commission–to propose mechanisms for the rapid Nigerianization of the civil service.

In 1954, the Government set up yet another Commission, this time, under the chairmanship of Mr. L.H. Gorsuch. The Gorsuch Commission’s terms of reference included submitting proposals on civil service organization structure, machinery for adjusting remuneration to variations in cost of living, arrangements for staff/management consultations, training, and machinery for (to quote Report of the Commission on the Civil Services of British West Africa, 1945-6, Accra: Government Printing Department) “regulating the selection and promotion of candidates for posts, the filling of which is not subject to the approval of the Secretary of State (for Colonies).”

The Gorsuch Commission was specifically required to:

(i)       enquire into the structure, and remuneration of the Public Service, with special reference to problems arising from the changes proposed at the Conference on the Nigerian Constitution, provided that the enquiry in respect of the Eastern Region shall not extend to any general upgrading or to a general salary revision of posts in the public service with initial salaries of more than £475 per annum;

(ii)      examine the problems from the individual aspect of the future Federal and Regional Governments in the light of all the factors involved both of similarity and divergence;

(iii)     make recommendations in a form suitable for submission to the future governments of the Federation and of the Regions.

A major outcome of the Gorsuch’s diagnostic study was the creation of a middle cadre, the General Executive Class, which the public service needed to relieve senior officials of the drudgery of routine administration. The creation of a middle cadre also ensured effective implementation of policies and programmes at the lower rungs of the civil service hierarchy.

To enhance public confidence in the neutrality and professionalism of the Public Service Commission, the Gorsuch Commission recommended that serving officials relinquish their membership of the recruitment body, and that independent, non-career, Commissioners be appointed in their places.

The Gorsuch Commission could also claim credit for another innovation—the creation of a “trainee” grade for both higher technical and executive officer cadres.

The structure proposed by the Gorsuch Commission remained intact for approximately two decades. It was not dismantled until the Public Service Review Commission of 1972-74 introduced the Unified Salary and Grading System in 1975.

It should be further noted that it was the Gorsuch Commission which recommended salary increases (the famous “Gorsuch awards”) for various classes of civil servants. To align the rising wage bill with performance, the Commission proposed the creation of an Establishments Branch in the Ministry of Finance to evaluate requests for increase in staff complements, and to advise on grading, remuneration, and allowances. The Branch was also to carry out O&M (Organization and Methods) studies with a view to simplifying work processes, improving the layout of offices, eliminating wasteful procedures, and generally enhancing productivity.

Meanwhile, and in anticipation of the attainment of independence in 1960, the colonial administration established a public service review body in 1959. The Newns Commission, named after Mr. A.F.F.P. Newns, eventually recommended the integration of the hitherto autonomous departments (e.g., education, agriculture, surveys, and public works) into multi-purpose ministries. It also recommended that the Minister be empowered to provide general policy direction while the permanent secretary was to serve as the Minister’s primary adviser on policy and head of the Ministry’s career service.

It is worth noting that, besides addressing structural challenges, the pre-independence public service review efforts left a few abiding (Whitehall-inspired) values, notably, those of integrity, professionalism, security of tenure, non-partisanship, and loyalty to the government of the day. As a matter of fact, it was during the colonial era that the General Orders were promulgated. A section of these General Orders forbade civil servants to identify publicly with any political party, candidate, or policy. Another section declared the enlistment of political support for career advancement ‘gross misconduct’, and placed on any official facing such misconduct charges the onus to show why disciplinary proceedings should not be instituted against her/him. These and other insurers of professionalism gradually atrophied when the General Orders were replaced by the post-Independence Civil Service Rules. This proves that not every change qualifies as reform, and not every reform yields positive, universally acclaimed, results.

M.J. Balogun was Special Adviser to the President of the 74^th Session of the United Nations General Assembly.