Understanding the electoral revolt against the mighty Botswana Democratic Party, By Yusuf Bangura

Former Botswana President Ian Khama (r) and his successor, Mokgweetsi Masisi (l).

The question we kept asking was: Why did a party with a historically stellar record in economic, social and infrastructural development and a near monopoly of power for 58 years lose so dramatically? In other words, why did the people turn against the party that gave them independence and lifted the country from a poor, beggar nation to one of Africa’s most prosperous?

Today was extremely hot. The temperature was about 36 degrees Celsius during much of the afternoon. It was difficult to walk around, visit sites, or engage in outdoor activities.

We decided, instead, to spend the day with friends at the university, learn about recent socioeconomic and political changes, gauge the public mood by talking randomly with people we met, relax at the hotel, and take stock of our overall trip before proceeding to Francistown tomorrow.

We wanted to understand the reasons for the sudden fall from power of the mighty Botswana Democratic Party. Virtually everyone one we spoke to or the newspaper articles we read didn’t believe the BDP would lose so decisively.

At the height of its power, at independence in 1966, the BDP enjoyed 80 per cent of the votes and 90 per cent of the seats in parliament. Despite a decline in vote and seat share in every election after 1966, the BDP always secured more than 50 per cent of the votes (apart from 2014 when it received only 46.5 per cent of the votes) and at least 66 per cent of the seats. In the 2019 election, it won 52.7 per cent of the vote and 66.6 per cent of the seats.

However, in the 31st October elections, it was reduced to a rump party in parliament, winning only four or 5.78 per cent of the seats and 30.5 per cent of the votes. It’s not even the official opposition in parliament, having come fourth in seat share — behind the Umbrella for Democratic Change (the new governing party), the Botswana Congress Party, and the Botswana Patriotic Front. This was a political earthquake that shocked even Batswana academics and newspaper columnists.

The question we kept asking was: Why did a party with a historically stellar record in economic, social and infrastructural development and a near monopoly of power for 58 years lose so dramatically? In other words, why did the people turn against the party that gave them independence and lifted the country from a poor, beggar nation to one of Africa’s most prosperous?

We talked to people we encountered, read a wide range of newspapers, and spent more than three hours at the university, largely with Keitseope Nthomang, a professor in the department of social work, whom I had worked with on a project on Democracy and Social Policy. He had promised to receive us at his office after we spoke on the phone yesterday.

Why the Mighty BDP Lost

Virtually everyone one we spoke with or article we read cited issues of corruption and dissatisfaction with the management of the economy as the key reasons for the defeat of the BDP.

Some, like our driver, Henry, believe that the outcome reflected largely voter discontent with the ruling party than strong support for the opposition. Nthomang described the situation as a popular revolt against the ruling party’s bigheadedness, complacency and deep seated corrupt practices, which threatened to reverse the values of meritocracy and a relatively clean government that the Batswana people had been accustomed to.

Economic Decline

Botswana’s economy has faced serious headwinds in recent years. The astonishing average growth rate of 7 per cent between 1966 and 1999, which was even higher than the miracle growth rates of the East Asian tiger economies, is now a thing of the past.

Importantly, growth has been anaemic since 2023, when it fell from about 5 per cent (itself low by historical standards) in the first quarter to 3.3 per cent in the second quarter and 0.5 per cent in the third quarter. Growth fell into the negative territory of -5.3 per cent and -0.5 per cent respectively in the first two quarters of 2024. This means that Botswana’s economy has technically been in a recession.

Critics accuse the Masisi government of profligacy and corruption. The tender system has been especially singled out for attack. The BDP government under Masisi was accused by those we spoke to, and reports in newspapers, of spawning a large patronage network that tried to dismantle the meritocratic system, which helped to build trust in government. Nthomang talked about state capture by powerful permanent secretaries, top party officials and leading Chinese and Indian businessmen in the procurement business.

The collapse in growth has largely been caused by low demand for the country’s diamonds and the fall in diamond prices. Botswana’s diamonds now face strong competition from lab-generated diamonds. Diamond production has contracted because of the fall in global demand for natural diamonds. IMF data suggest, however, that inflation is stable and within the central bank’s targeted range of 3-6 per cent; and public debt, at 20 per cent of GDP, is relatively low.

Batswana academics and commentators complain, however, about the collapse of the highly acclaimed Government Investment Account (GIA) — one of the funds set up by the government to manage the windfall from diamonds, stabilise the economy, and save money from the diamond wealth for future generations. It has been reported that the GIA fell from 6.5 billion pula in July to only 1.9 billion pula in August.

Patronage and Corruption

Critics accuse the Masisi government of profligacy and corruption. The tender system has been especially singled out for attack. The BDP government under Masisi was accused by those we spoke to, and reports in newspapers, of spawning a large patronage network that tried to dismantle the meritocratic system, which helped to build trust in government. Nthomang talked about state capture by powerful permanent secretaries, top party officials and leading Chinese and Indian businessmen in the procurement business.

Foreign businessmen funded the BDP to win contracts; permanent secretaries, who act as accounting officers, benefited immensely in the processing of contracts; and party officials used political power and connections to win tenders and inflate costs at various points in the contract system. Access to a BDP party card, not merit or performance, became the most important instrument for success in business.

According to Nthomang, it is very difficult to get rich in Botswana without the public knowing about it because the population, especially the elite, is very small. There is a very high level of interaction. People may have attended the same school or university or grown up in the same area. Significantly, it is reported that the public frowns at the sudden riches of the new, young elite, who have used party power and connections to forge ahead. It is believed that the massive swing against the BDP represented total voter rejection of the deviation from its tradition of meritocracy and enthronement of patronage politics.

The flaunting of new-found wealth by the BDP elite was particularly irksome in an environment of high levels of unemployment, estimated at about 28 per cent, and inequality, as well as a highly restive youth population that accounts for 60 per cent of the electorate. One columnist described the shock defeat of the BDP as a youthquake.

One of the problems we identified in the project on “Poverty Reduction and Policy Regimes” in 2006 still persists: the failure of Botswana’s model of structural change (its movement from agriculture to mining, as opposed to manufacturing) to generate high levels of employment.

The government makes good use of its diamond wealth, but it has not been able to diversify the economy and generate enough jobs for the youth population, which joins the labour force every year at an alarming rate. I was surprised to learn, for instance, that there is still no leather producing company in the country, despite the abundant livestock and a flourishing meat company. And we learnt that Indians dominate the processing of diamonds and they import cheap labour from India to work on the diamonds.

We noticed that the high level of unemployment in the country has produced some West and East Africa-style small-scale informal trading activities that are beginning to clutter parts of the city. The bus station, which takes passengers to various parts of country, looks cluttered and crowded.

Khama is believed to be highly respected by the Tswana. His mistreatment by Masisi, who stripped him of his power to appoint a regent in his area, was frowned upon by voters. However, his party was seen as a sub-ethnic Tswana party by voters and only won seats in the central region, Khama’s power base… Nthomang believes that Khama commands respect among most chiefs and civil society groups, and his primary goal in the 2024 election was to prevent Masisi from getting re-elected.

Botswana’s success is largely its pursuit of effective macroeconomic policies; investment in infrastructure, education and health; and offering a safety net to the old and infirm.

The crisis in the diamond industry has exposed the limitations of this model of development. An economy that cannot find jobs for about 30 per cent of its people is unsustainable.

Young people have put their trust in the new government of the Umbrella for Democratic Change headed by a Harvard-trained lawyer, Duma Boko, who has promised to create between 450,000 and 500,000 jobs and pay workers a ‘living wage’ of 4,000 pula a month. It is banking on a growth rate of 10 per cent to achieve this. It’s not clear, however, how it intends to recreate the growth miracle and push the economy in a different direction this time — around value-enhancing, perhaps manufacturing, activities.

One other explanation we heard about the collapse of the BDP is the bitter rivalry between Ian Khama, the son of the founding president, Seretsi Khama, and Mokgweetsi Masisi, although one person we spoke with — our guide at the heroes monument — downplayed the significance of the rivalry as an explanatory factor since Khama’s party only won seats in the central area of the country where it is strong. Nothomang had a different, more academic and, perhaps, plausible insight.

Khama groomed Masisi and handed power to him, but they became bitter rivals within a year of Masisi assuming the presidency. Khama resigned from the BDP and formed another party, the Botswana Patriotic Front. This became a regional party, with no real chance of winning power at the centre.

I was pleased to see that Botswana’s ethnic structure (in which the Tswana account for more than 80 per cent of the population), which we identified in the project on “Ethnic Structure, Inequality, and Governance of the Public Sector,” as helpful in promoting intra-Tswana fragmentation and offering possibilities for cordial inter-ethnic cooperation continues to play that role in Botswana’s electoral politics.

Because of the numerical dominance of the Tswana, the BDP does not control all the votes of the Tswana. The Tswana vote is fragmented into multiple parties, and smaller ethnic groups, such as the Kalanga, play active roles in parties led by the Tswana. Under this system, it is possible to have huge swings in voter behaviour, especially when backed by first-past-the-post electoral rules, if a ruling party becomes unpopular. A system with an ethnically polarised ethnic structure would not have produced the swing that reduced the BDP into a rump party.

Khama is believed to be highly respected by the Tswana. His mistreatment by Masisi, who stripped him of his power to appoint a regent in his area, was frowned upon by voters. However, his party was seen as a sub-ethnic Tswana party by voters and only won seats in the central region, Khama’s power base.

Nthomang believes that Khama commands respect among most chiefs and civil society groups, and his primary goal in the 2024 election was to prevent Masisi from getting re-elected.

What all these developments underscore is the maturation of Botswana’s democracy. Let’s hope that the new government find a way of stimulating the stagnant economy in a new direction of job creation for its teeming and restless youth.

Yusuf Bangura wrote from Gaborone, Botswana.